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Historically, financial crises have been commonplace. Why did 
the latest episode almost derail the world economy? The macro- 
economics developed by John Maynard Keynes and his close 
followers provides the only plausible set of answers, including rising 
income inequality which spilled over into debt accumulation at the 
same time as household consumption rose, low real interest rates, 
massive expansion of financial assets and liabilities as investors 
borrowed heavily (increased leverage) to buy assets with rising 
prices, and an ample supply of imports and capital inflows from 
the rest of the world. In an accommodating political economic en- 
vironment these factors linked the real and financial sides of the 
economy to create the crisis.
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I. Introduction
John Maynard Keynes was correct about how to do macroeconomics, 
and the mainstream economists’ counter-attack launched against his 
ideas beginning in the 1940s was simply wrong. This paper expands 
on these points, drawing on a forthcoming book, Maynard's Revenge: 
The Collapse of Free Market Macroeconomics (Taylor 2010).
It will be argued that the macroeconomics created by Keynes and his 
closest followers provides the only plausible path toward understanding 
the huge changes that engulfed the world economy in the last quarter 
of the 20
th century. The narrative incorporates major shifts in behavior 
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on the real and financial sides of the U.S. and global economies after 
around 1980. Changes in the distributions of income and wealth played 
central roles. In George Soros’s (2009) terminology, economic actors’ 
imperfect cognitive perceptions about the economic system interacted 
with their limited ability to manipulate it to produce the crisis of 2007- 
09.
Secondly, cognition and manipulation will mutate in ways that are 
impossible to foresee. The political economy that will emerge in the 
20-teens will differ markedly from the one in place during the late 20
th 
and early 21
st centuries. At the level of mere macroeconomics, Keynesian 
principles are the only tools available to help guide the system through 
a fraught transition to a new regime whose nature as of 2009 is veiled 
by “the dark forces of time and ignorance.”
We begin by considering long-term shifts from a political economic 
perspective. We then summarize important ideas from Keynes and his 
school ( largely practicing in Cambridge U.K.), followed by a recital of 
the major macroeconomic changes that took place after around 1980. 
Using this material as background, the key forces that created the 
crisis are reviewed, leading into observations about developments that 
may be in store and how policies may be designed to help cope with 
them.
II. Long Swings in Political Economy
The share in income (including realized capital gains) of the richest 
one percent of the U.S. population in 1929 was around 22.5%. It fell to 
about 9% in 1979, and then rose again to 22.5% in 2006 (Piketty and 
Saez 2003). An index of the share of wages in value-added discussed 
below fell from cyclical peak levels of about 105 during the 1960s and 
1970s to around 97.5 when the most recent cycle peaked in the mid- 
2000s. The swing toward greater income inequality in the USA after 
around 1980 was associated with notable changes in the way the 
macroeconomic system behaved.
Great political economists have emphasized that there are long waves 
in how the economy functions, going well beyond the tedious trudge of 
formal growth models toward a steady state in which all relevant ratios 
of macroeconomic variables stay constant (see below). In his Great 
Transformation, Karl Polanyi (1944) saw a double movement in 19
th cen- 
tury Europe, first toward a liberalized market system largely created by 
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state intervention. It was followed by regulation aimed at reducing the 
worst aspects of capitalism such as child labor, a long work week, and 
unemployment. A counter-reaction to regulation and the trauma of    
WWI helped set the stage for rising inequality and Fascism in the first 
third of the 20
th century. The Great Crash and Depression set off the 
Keynesian period that followed.
Michal Kalecki (1971) described a political business cycle in which 
capitalists can at times convince the state to hold the level of economic 
activity below the full employment level, to cut into the power of 
workers. The contemporary Cambridge economist Gabriel Palma (2009) 
describes how the two adversary classes operate. “Both seek to change 
the balance of power between income groups: [workers advocate] 
Keynesianism in order to prevent the disruptive effects of crisis-ridden 
capitalism, [capitalists advance] neo-liberalism in order to return power 
and control to their ‘rightful owners’ ― capital.” 
A similar cycle between public and private domination of the economy 
was pointed out by Albert Hirschman (1982). Characteristically he 
adopted a dialectical formulation built around a rebound effect between 
social preferences for public and private control of the economy. After 
general frustration with the ruling situation crosses a threshold, the 
rebound kicks in.
Broadly speaking, such theories are consistent with a long term 
political economy cycle in the 20
th century. The early liberal phase (in 
the European sense of the word) ended with the Depression. The 
rebound continued through the New Deal and WWII into the Golden 
Age of the 1950s and 1960s. Building up the welfare state (a develop- 
ment not anticipated by Keynes) was a major contributing factor to a 
sustained and historically unprecedented output boom. This long cycle 
broke down during the stagflation of the 1970s, and was succeeded by 
a new liberal resurgence beginning around 1980. 
One problem with these theories is that they are unclear about 
agency ― how do actors (individual or collective) proceed to alter the 
situation at hand, and why do they do it? Palma quotes an advisor to 
Mrs. Thatcher who had apparently had read his Kalecki on the benefits 
of recessions for capital, but such observations are unusual. Nor is it 
clear whether the latest liberal cycle really ended in 2009. Even if in 
some sense it did, the extended transitions between Polanyi’s 19
th and 
20
th century cycles suggest that macroeconomic changes during the 
decade of the 20-teens are unpredictable, and may be dramatically 
unstable. The only way to think about them is with Keynes.
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III. Lessons from the Master
Keynes’s foremost idea is that all economic decisions are taken 
under conditions of fundamental uncertainty ― not “risk” in the sense 
that possible events in the future can be fully described by an objective 
probability distribution known to at least some (and possibly all) par- 
ticipants in the market. For example, from Keynes’s point of view the 
idea that sub-prime mortgage borrowers’ probabilities of default could 
be quantified on the basis of historical data during a period in which 
housing prices rose at an unprecedented rate was nonsense ― of 
course prices could always go down as demonstrated after 2005. 
A. Two Sets of Prices
The recent significance of housing price fluctuations points to the 
fact, noted by Keynes and emphasized by his followers, that a capitalist 
economy has two sets of prices ― for assets such as housing and se- 
curities, and for goods and services. In his magnum opus, the General 
Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, Keynes broke from the 
quantity theory (which says that the overall commodity price level is 
determined by the money supply) that he espoused in his Tract on 
Monetary Reform a dozen or so years before. Rather, he assumed that 
goods and services prices are driven by costs ― notably the wage and 
exchange rates as costs of labor and imports respectively. 
Like the younger Keynes mainstream economists assume that com- 
modity prices are determined by monetary forces. Monetarism in its 
contemporary incarnation is inflation targeting. Tightening money by 
raising the interest rate is supposed to slow down increases in goods 
and services prices. With low inflation in the 1990s and 2000s, the 
Fed apparently thought that it could safely hold interest rates down, 
arguably setting the stage for spiraling asset prices which can take off 
when the ratio of asset returns including capital gains to interest rates 
is high.
Along with financial deregulation, rising prices for housing ― the 
principal household asset ― helped propel rapid expansion of debt to 
help support high levels of consumption even as consumers’ real income 
positions deteriorated (details below). The rapid increase in debt fed 
into a financial boom based on securitization or bundling mortgages into 
highly structured bonds which could be sold in the market.
Keynes would say that thinking that securitizing the increasing 
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volume of debt would “diversify” default risk was nonsense upon stilts. 
So long as housing prices kept rising, consumers increased their 
borrowing. Financial traders ran up more debt with one another and 
the rest of the world to buy more securitized mortgages. When housing 
prices stalled and started to go down, an unexpectedly high number of 
borrowers walked away from their mortgages and the whole highly 
leveraged and securitized house of cards went down. Keynes did not 
discuss bubbles based upon linked increases in asset prices and 
leverage but Charles Kindleberger ― a true blue Keynesian ― certainly 
did (see Kindleberger and Aliber 2005). Soros’s model of financial cycles 
follows a similar line.
For the real side of the economy, Keynes used psychological and 
sociological observation to frame hypotheses about how market actors 
operate ― hence his assumed dependence of saving on income and of 
investment on interest and profit rates along with asset prices. He also 
thought that saving and investment decisions were strongly affected by 
current economic perceptions, or “expectations.”
As securitized finance imploded in 2007-09, expectations shifted. 
Fear pure and simple drove households to save more and business 
investors to spend less so that aggregate demand and real output 
plummeted. Surviving financial institutions curtailed lending in a flight 
to liquidity while those that survived the crisis in better shape re- 
engaging in trading games within less than a year. Keynes argued 
vigorously that Say’s Law of markets does not apply. With his principle 
of effective demand operating there is no natural tendency for the 
economy to arrive at full employment. Mainstream economics completely 
ignored these insights, with the reaction beginning as early as the 
1940s.
The experience of 2007-09 shows that under pervasive fundamental 
uncertainty, the economy is unpredictable and at times may be highly 
unstable. The applicability of any macro model is contingent upon 
events which few if any players foresee ― the economy can always 
swerve. But Keynes provided useful categories for thinking about it.
B. Keynesian Categories
One is setting up models involving collective social actors instead of 
“rational” agents which act individually. The quotation marks are meant 
to signal that most people’s understanding of rationality lies light-years 
away from the standard macroeconomists’ assumption that it amounts 
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to behaving consistently with a “true” model of the economy (which on 
the basis of Keynesian ontology cannot possibly exist). The justification 
for thinking about collective actors is that the socioeconomic circums- 
tances in which groups of people operate ― be they sweepers in Mumbai 
or traders on Wall Street ― impel them toward shared economic atti- 
tudes and patterns of behavior. Even after 2007-09, the fact that 
financial sector leaders in both Europe and the USA seemed to think 
that the system that failed should be largely reinstated with their same 
income levels as before demonstrates the strength of collective patterns 
of belief.
Fallacies of composition can easily arise, in which apparently rational 
decisions at the level of individual or collective actors create a macro- 
economically unsustainable situation. How that happened after 1980 is 
discussed below.
Considering broad social classes of collective actors means that 
macroeconomic models can conveniently be based on the sectoral/ 
functional income distribution built into the national income and pro- 
duct accounts (largely by Keynes and his followers James Meade and 
Richard Stone at the U.K. Treasury in the early 1940s). Distributive 
issues in the discussion to follow are described in terms of the func- 
tional rather than the size distribution of income because the former 
fits more easily into macroeconomic discourse. As noted above, since 
around 1980 data from both approaches pointing toward higher in- 
equality are broadly consistent.
There is always distributive conflict among classes, at times latent 
and at other times painfully visible. It may lead to overt hostility or be 
displaced into other areas. Inflation has been a common outcome of 
conflicting income claims worldwide. As recognized by Keynes, the 
German hyperinflation in the early 1920s can be traced to workers’ 
attempts to restore their pre-WWI real income level by pushing up 
money wages abetted by a compliant central bank. U.S. stagflation in 
the 1970s is another example, which was ended by tight money and 
union-busting under Reagan. Running up debt, as sketched above and 
analyzed below, can be another outcome of conflict (a point raised by 
Albert Hirschman among others). 
On the financial side, Keynes’s villains in the General Theory were 
high savers and bear speculators holding out for high interest rates. 
He thought that these groups, probably overlapping in terms of social 
background, would cause long-term stagnation by holding down ag- 
gregate demand. Both groups were conspicuously absent in the U.S. 
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during the 1990s while investors’ animal spirits were high. The dot. 
com asset price crash ended a very Keynesian boom, a possibility that 
he did not fully consider.
Rather, Keynes proposed a business cycle theory with output swings 
upward and downward led by investment. Along with shifts in the level 
of saving, he thought that changes in the interest rate would be the 
main factor amplifying or dampening the cycle. The basic framework 
fits the recent period, but with movements in distribution, debt (which 
did not enter into his cycle theory), and asset prices playing central 
roles.
Finally, Keynes devoted a lot of effort in the 1920s to formulating 
industrial policies to deal with structural unemployment in Britain’s 
lagging industries such as coal. In the 1940s he labored long and hard 
to set up a stable, balanced global macroeconomic system. How such 
ideas can be updated to deal with contemporary problems is a pressing 
issue.
IV. Ideas from the Disciples
Fundamental uncertainty, the absence of Say’s Law, and the presence 
of tensions between the classes characterize Keynes’s economics. Over 
more than three generations his close followers, many at the University 
of Cambridge and a few in the USA, have extended Keynesianism into 
an impressive body of thought. It is virtually unrecognized by the 
American mainstream but nevertheless provides insights into the latest 
long liberal political economy cycle and the events of 2007-09. The 
models about to be described should be interpreted as being contingent 
on fundamental uncertainty, with specifications that must be adjusted 
accordingly.
A. Macroeconomic Behavior
Nicholas Kaldor (1978) argued that like the level of economic activity, 
the rate of economic growth is driven from the demand side. In his 
models from the 1960s the growth rate may or may not converge to a 
steady state level and full employment is not guaranteed. Because of 
economies of scale and technological advances embodied in learning 
processes as well as new capital goods, the growth rate of labor pro- 
ductivity responds positively to the rate of output growth, especially in 
industry (an increase in the output growth rate of 1% may be associ- 
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ated with an increase of 0.5% in productivity growth). Arthur Okun’s 
Law from the U.S. in the 1960s conveys a similar message, with an 
emphasis on cyclical fluctuations in productivity.
Like all Cambridge economists including Keynes (though he down- 
played it), Kaldor assumed that saving is influenced by the income 
distribution. In a convenient formulation, the private sector saving rate 
from income is a decreasing function of the wage share of total income. 
Kalecki proposed a theory in which investment is driven by the rate 
of profit. His follower Josef Steindl added the level of economic activity 
(measured as the rate of capacity utilization) as an additional deter- 
minant. A model can also be set up in terms of the output/capital ratio 
as a measure of utilization and the profit share of GDP (the profit rate 
divided by the output/capital ratio, with profit share＋wage share＝1) 
representing distribution. In an economy open to foreign trade at a 
given level of the exchange rate, exports are likely to respond positively 
to the profit share because an increase signals a reduction in unit 
labor costs. 
With these investment and export functions and a Cambridge saving 
function in force, output and the rate of capital stock growth as deter- 
mined by aggregate demand can both respond either positively or nega- 
tively to an increase in the wage share. The alternative possibilities 
have come to be called “wage-led” and “profit-led” respectively.
B. Distributive Cycles in Effective Demand
Richard Goodwin (1967), an American who ended up in Cambridge 
for political reasons and also spent time in Siena as an eminent abstract 
painter, set up a model of cyclical growth based on a Cambridge savings 
function. His dynamic specification took the form of a highly simplified 
system borrowed from models of predators (say foxes or the wage share) 
and prey (rabbits or the level of saving) in mathematical ecology. Faster 
growth stimulates employment. Higher employment in turn drives up the 
wage share, reducing saving and cutting into growth. The resulting cycle 
closely resembles one proposed by Marx in Volume I of Capital.
Goodwin’s model is not Keynesian because its level of investment is 
determined by available saving, following Say’s Law and Marx. However 
its pattern of cyclicality can easily be extended in a Keynes-Kalecki- 
Steindl direction by incorporating dynamics of the wage share, which is 
equal to the real wage divided by the level of labor productivity. In this 
set-up Kaldor-Okun productivity dynamics come to the fore. As an 
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economy comes out of a recession, labor productivity usually rises be- 
cause firms have been hoarding labor during the trough in anticipa- 
tion of rising output in the future. When that happens, productivity or 
the output/labor ratio goes up. This jump forces the labor share down- 
ward, stimulating aggregate demand in a profit-led economy. 
As output rises, productivity growth tails off and the real wage starts 
to rise as the labor market tightens. The income distribution shifts 
against profits, slowing demand growth near the upper turning point. 
As will be seen, such a system with profit-led demand and a “full em- 
ployment profit squeeze” is not a bad fit to the business cycle in the 
USA.
C. Macro Accounting Restrictions
Keynes built his macroeconomic system around the postulate that 
the value of output is always equal to income. This “identity” serves as 
the foundation for all contemporary national accounting. The Cambridge 
Keynesian Wynne Godley (see Godley and Lavoie 2007) emphasizes 
three important implications.
One is that the excess of spending over income can take either sign 
for any individual or socioeconomic group (say households, non-financial 
business, financial business, government, and rest of the world), but 
that the economy-wide sum of these “net borrowing” flows must be 
zero. As will be seen, a decomposition of net borrowing provides a con- 
venient means for analyzing macro cycles and trends.
Second, in a complete accounting set-up with no “black holes” one 
can see how shifting ratios of macro flows (e.g., investment in new 
capital goods, saving, etc.) and stocks (e.g., the capital stock, net worth 
or wealth, etc.) can either stabilize or destabilize the system. The fiction 
built into economic growth theory is that all flow/flow, flow/stock, and 
stock/stock ratios converge to “steady state” levels (or perhaps cycle 
around them as in a Goodwin model). We will see that over the recent 
long political economy cycle the U.S. economy key variables have 
demonstrated divergent trends.
Finally, global macroeconomic accounting without black holes reveals 
that there is not much room for variables such as exchange rates and 
external deficits to adjust independently of one another (in the jargon 
the system has very few “degrees of freedom”). How one can ascertain 
directions of macroeconomic causality when they are so circumscribed 
has been subject to fierce debate.
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In a bit more detail, suppose that two countries with output deter- 
mined by effective demand share a current account balance between 
them. Its level responds to the exchange rate between their two cur- 
rencies. So either the level of the balance could be (somehow) fixed, or 
else shifts in the exchange rate could drive the balance. More generally, 
for N countries there will be N－1 degrees of freedom on current ac- 
count.
Now consider national balance sheets, which can adjust rapidly to 
capital movements. Without capital controls, one can show that if cen- 
tral banks are fixing interest rates, then the exchange rate between 
them will be stable unless one country intervenes in markets to control 
its level of international reserves and the other country acquiesces. 
Then the rate will have to float. This game also generalizes to N coun- 
tries with N－1 degrees of freedom on capital account.
The bottom line is that with rapid adjustment in capital markets and 
much slower adjustment in trade, among N countries N－1 bilateral 
exchange rates are determined on capital account which in turn, all 
other factors held equal, determine current account balances. The rates 
can either float or be fixed by policy interventions (which can include 
controls on capital movements, as in China) with at least one country 
accepting the consequences. Implications are pursued below.
D. Finance
Turning to the financial side, we have already noted Charlie Kind- 
leberger’s historical discussion of asset price booms fueled by increasing 
debt ― a good description of the run-up to the 2007-09 crisis (also 
pointed out by Soros). Such phenomena were not emphasized by Keynes. 
Nor was the increasing financial fragility due to rising debt-service 
burdens in an upswing emphasized by the American Keynesian Hyman 
Minsky (2008), though his macro model is a natural extension of 
Keynes’s trade cycle theory discussed above. Besides debt burdens 
Minsky emphasizes the influence of changing asset prices on financial 
decision-making over the cycle. 
Minsky also argued that financial evolution linked to fragility can be 
destabilizing. Via changes in asset and commodity prices and its poli- 
tical efforts to remove regulatory controls, a growing financial sector 
can upset the rest of the system in several ways.
Bailing out finance in recurring crises encourages the surviving insti- 
tutions to move into more fundamentally uncertain territory because 
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they are less inhibited by regulatory restriction. Traders always respond 
to short term incentives for high uncertainty/high return trading and 
management may not be able to stop their games. Responsible Boards 
of Directors of aggressive firms might wish to rein in their traders but 
do not do so for fear of “losing talent.” Every financial shake out in 
which at least some institutions get rescued seems to worsen these 
problems of moral hazard.
Cutting interest rates to support the level of output when inflation is 
low may stimulate an asset price bubble, feeding into output expan- 
sion. On the fiscal side, a stimulus package could provoke commodity 
price inflation, especially if labor is in a position to meet price increases 
by successfully bargaining for higher wages which could lead to further 
increases in prices, etc.
But then if the central bank raises rates to slow the economy it 
could provoke an asset price crash and major recession, creating a 
need to bail out the system once again.
V. The Theory and Data for the USA
The next step is to use these theories to discuss how decisions of 
different social groups shaped post-WWII developments in the U.S. and 
world economies, especially during the long-term liberal cycle that 
settled in after 1980. The discussion begins on the real side of the 
economy, switches to the financial side, brings in international com- 
plications, and then ties the three together.
A. Labor Productivity and the Goodwin Cycle
Figure 1 illustrates cyclical behavior of labor productivity. The data 
are presented in the form of quarterly logarithmic deviations (basically 
growth rates) of macro level productivity from its trend. The shaded 
areas represent recessions as defined by the National Bureau of Eco- 
nomic Research (NBER). The general picture fits the stylized description 
set out above, with productivity rising as the economy moves out of a 
recession trough, and then leveling off or growing more slowly than the 
trend. 
Together with rising real wages, this pattern of productivity changes 
generated the fluctuations in the index of the labor share (solid line) 
shown in Figure 2. Economic activity also appears in the diagram, 
represented by “capacity utilization,” or output divided by its trend (the 
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FIGURE 1
DEVIATION OF ACTUAL LABOR PRODUCTIVITY FROM ITS TREND 
(LOG OF QUOTIENT) FOR THE U.S. BUSINESS SECTOR
dashed line). Typically, utilization jumped up rapidly in a “V shape” as 
the economy emerged from recession. In 2007, utilization moved down 
sharply. At the time of this writing whether the fall will be as great as 
the one between 1979 and 1983 remained to be seen.
Prior to 1980, periods between recessions were relatively brief. That 
tendency began to weaken in the 1960s, but reappeared in the fol- 
lowing decade of stagflation. Between the early 1980s and late 2000s 
there were only three recessions. This change is usually attributed to 
increased ability of households and firms to smooth their spending 
flows by using new sources of finance. 
Throughout the period, the labor share followed the Goodwin cycle 
described above, moving downward as the economy emerged from re- 
cession, and then rising later in the upswing. The pattern persisted 
after 1980, superimposed on a clear downward trend. 
B. Net Borrowing
Figure 3 summarizes data à la Godley on net borrowing flows by 
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FIGURE 2
TIME SERIES FOR CAPACITY UTILIZATION AND LABOR SHARE
households, the rest of the private sector (“business”), government, and 
the rest of the world. Household borrowing is approximated by the 
difference between residential investment and gross saving. The flows 
are presented as shares of GDP. The shaded areas again signal periods 
of recession. Several changes over time stand out.
After the pattern break in the early 1980s there was a steady down- 
ward movement in foreign net borrowing (or foreign net lending to the 
U.S. went up). The trend was interrupted by a brief recovery around 
1990, mostly due to capital inflows which financed military services 
rendered during the Gulf War. The external deficit fell during 2007-09, 
in response to the sharp reduction in economic activity illustrated in 
Figure 2.
After around 1980 the pattern for household net borrowing was 
almost a mirror image of foreign borrowing, with the sign reversed. The 
question about which movement “caused” the other is under intense 
debate, as discussed below.
During Golden Age and stagflation, household borrowing was negative 
(or the sector’s lending was positive). The foreign gap as a share of 
GDP was around zero, implying that households financed deficits of 
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FIGURE 3
SECTORAL NET BORROWING FLOWS NORMALIZED BY 
GDP AND NBER REFERENCE CYCLES
business and the government, a pattern built into traditional Keynesian 
models. As discussed below the change in the household borrowing 
pattern was the result of an increasing consumption share in disposable 
income and a corresponding fall in saving. These trends reversed ab- 
ruptly in the mid-2000s accompanied by a big drop in residential in- 
vestment, setting off the subsequent recession ― a clear violation of 
Say’s Law.
Two points about the business cycle should be mentioned. Throughout 
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FIGURE 4
INDEXES OF NOMINAL AND REAL S&P 500 AND GDP DEFLATOR RESCALED 
(2000Q1＝100)
the period, household net borrowing led the cycle in capacity utilization, 
swinging upward as the economy emerged from recession. Rising re- 
sidential investment was the driving force. Whether or not this pattern 
reappears will play a big role in determining the strength of recovery 
after 2010.
Secondly, government net borrowing is counter-cyclical because of 
changes in tax receipts and pro-cyclical spending driven by automatic 
stabilizers such as unemployment insurance along with conscious shifts 
in fiscal policy. The Obama stimulus package shows up clearly at the 
right side of the diagram. 
C. Asset Prices
With these developments on the real side as background, we can 
bring asset prices into the discussion. Two key points are relevant to 
macroeconomics post-1980.
Figure 4 shows how a long upswing in the stock market got under- 
way around 1980. It peaked in the late 1990s, followed by a sharp 
decline and then recovery. Using the GDP deflator for prices of goods 
and services (the broadest index available) to restate the S&P 500 
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FIGURE 5
HOUSING PRICE INDEXES AND GDP DEFLATOR (2000Q1＝100)
index shows that equity prices in real terms did not recover their late 
1990s level after the upswing in the early 2000s.
Prior to the mid-1990s, housing price indexes shown in Figure 5 
tracked the GDP deflator rather closely. Thereafter their growth accel- 
erated, with the move upward lasting for roughly a decade. Observing 
the data presented in the diagram, it is difficult to avoid calling the 
housing price excursion a bubble.
D. Interest and Profit Rates
The Keynes-Minsky business cycle theory sketched above suggests 
that interest and profit rates do not move together. Along with a falling 
labor share, low interest rates as the economy emerges from a trough 
stimulate rising profitability, which gets cut back at the peak. Standard 
“Fisher arbitrage” arguments from mainstream theory suggest that the 
profit and real interest rates should tend toward equality, but this 
tendency is not observed in the data.
This cyclical pattern can be seen in Figure 6, which adds the in- 
teresting twist of opposing movements of the two rates over the 
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FIGURE 6
PROFIT RATE AND REAL SHORT- AND MEDIUM-TERM INTEREST RATES
Keynesian and liberal long cycles after WWII (profit rates are computed 
from national accounts and flows of funds data, but similar movements 
show up in other estimates).
Real interest rates prior to the 1970s were low but positive. They 
went negative during the stagflation period, shot up with the Fed’s 
monetary shock at the end of the decade, and then drifted downward. 
The decrease after the mid-1990s reflects the “Greenspan put” in Fed 
policy which took the form of cutting interest rates after each financial 
tremor. An attempt at monetary tightening in the mid-2000s had some 
impact in real terms but was limited in part by factors such as capital 
inflows from the carry trade.
The profit rate gradually fell during the Keynesian Golden Age, hit a 
trough after the interest rate shock, and rose strongly thereafter. The 
increase since the 1980s is the counterpart of the decrease in the labor 
share noted above (at the macro level, the profit share is the profit rate 
times the output/capital ratio). It also was a response to steadily falling 
interest rates.
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E. Institutional Changes in Finance
Minsky’s insights into financial evolution played out in detail, begin- 
ning in 1980 with the abolition of the Fed’s Regulation Q putting a 
ceiling on deposit rates. This step was followed by a long sequence of 
moves relaxing financial sector controls, all pushed politically by the 
financial industry. Deregulation continued through the Garn-St. Germain 
Act which was supposed to save the Savings and Loan system but in 
fact provoked a crisis, went on to hands-off policy regarding derivative 
transactions in the 1990s and the abolition of the Glass-Steagall Act in 
1999, and then to relaxation of leverage restrictions on big investment 
banks in 2004. During the same period, policies aggressively promoting 
home ownership fed into the sub-prime mortgage boom and subsequent 
crash.
All these changes encouraged financial firms to engage in high 
uncertainty/high return trading operations which took the form of 
running up debt to acquire assets with prices that in effect were 
assumed to be rising along exponential growth paths (subject to mild 
shocks) that would last forever. When prices inevitably fell, leverage or 
the ratio of assets to equity shot up, forcing firms to try to dispose of 
their assets in an imploding market.
Derivative transactions, off-balance sheet vehicles, and the expansion 
of the originate-and-distribute model of asset securitization through the 
shadow banking system made financial fragility that much worse.
A final contributing factor was the emergence of academic finance 
theory beginning in the 1950s. It added a luster of “scientifically based” 
valuations to collaterized debt obligations, credit default swaps, and 
any number of other forms of derivatives. Along the lines argued by the 
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, finance theory with its key assump- 
tion of fully efficient, completely deregulated markets dominated the 
discourse about financial practices to the extent that bankers were 
freed to engage in destabilizing transactions completely shielded from 
any critical view. Their regulators shared the same mentality. Small 
wonder that there was a crash.
F. Housing Prices, Household Debt, and Interest Rates
In retrospect, the major channel via which asset price movements 
and institutional changes in the financial sector affected the real side 
of the economy ran through shifts in household consumption and bor- 
rowing. Distributive changes were at the heart of the matter, as illus- 
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FIGURE 7
WAGE SHARE OF VALUE-ADDED, CONSUMPTION SHARE OF 
DISPOSABLE INCOME, AND HOUSEHOLD DEBT TO INCOME 
RATIO WITH NBER REFERENCE RECESSIONS
trated in Figure 7.
The diagram shows that the post-1980 decline in the wage share of 
total income noted above was accompanied by a steady increase in an 
index of the consumption share of households’ disposable income. Much 
of the consumption increase was due to rising spending on health 
care. The household saving rate fell sharply over the period.
How did households sustain rising consumption at the same time as 
the wage share declined and real income was stagnant or falling across 
most deciles of the size distribution of income? The answer, of course, 
is steadily rising indebtedness, with the debt/income ratio more than 
doubling between the early 1980s and the mid-2000s. Potential distri- 
butive conflict, as Hirschman observed, was diverted into increasing 
debt. George W. Bush’s cheerleading about an emerging “ownership 
society” was a rationalization of this change.
Associated trends show up in Figure 8. The decline in the real 
medium-term interest rate has already been noted. By bidding up the 
ratio of returns to holding housing (including capital gains) to the cost 
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FIGURE 8
REAL MEDIUM-TERM INTEREST RATE, HOUSING PRICES, AND 
REAL HOUSEHOLD DEBT WITH NBER REFERENCE RECESSIONS
of finance, it fed into the growth of the real housing price index. That 
increase, in turn, was accompanied by growth in real debt. Toward the 
end of the period, the debt expansion continued for a year or two after 
the break in price growth, overshooting its source of nourishment. 
There is some inconsistency in the literature about whether expansion 
of liabilities typically continues after a boom in asset prices ends, or 
not. Kindleberger suggests that credit expansion ends with the crash, 
while Soros gives examples of overshooting.
Be that as it may, Figure 9 adds another viewpoint on households’ 
behavior ― prior to the stock market crash in the late 1990s, the ratio 
of their spending to net worth (with equity and mutual fund valuations 
and the value of housing as major components) declined steadily after 
the late 1970s. They could be seen as rationally converting income in 
the form of capital gains into current spending power.
The equity crash set off a jump in the expenditure/net worth ratio 
because the denominator went down. It subsequently fell back and 
then shot up again after housing prices dropped. Meanwhile the debt/ 
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FIGURE 9
HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND EXPENDITURE RELATIVE TO NET WORTH
net worth ratio was quite stable until its denominator went down and 
numerator rose after the mid-1990s. As opposed to the financial sector, 
households did not engage in active leverage games until falling asset 
prices boosted their debt/net worth in the 2000s.
Cognitive misperceptions and inappropriate actions acted together at 
many levels to produce this most recent Kindlebergian Mania, Panic, 
and Crash. From a Keynesian perspective its unfolding can be un- 
derstood as encompassing distinct groups of social actors with im- 
perfect knowledge. There was effectively an alliance between mostly 
non-affluent households, finance, and politicians in power (backing the 
expansion of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, for example) in support of 
more debt. Even if each group could be seen as pursuing its own self- 
interest, macroeconomically they created an unstable situation ― a 
Keynesian fallacy of composition came into play with a vengeance.
A mainstream economist might well ask how macroeconomic output 
determination by effective demand combined with rising income in- 
equality could translate into incentives for millions of households to go 
into debt, aided and abetted by financial innovation. But it happened. 
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Capital gains on equity and housing spilled over into behavior on the 
real side which overwhelmed presumptions of perfect foresight and the 
applicability of Say’s Law.
G. No Steady State
There is a strong presumption in economic growth theory that the 
economy will tend toward or cycle around a steady state position at 
which all ratios of stocks and flows are stable. During the liberal long 
cycle of the late 20
th and early 21st centuries, no such pattern has 
been observed. The Goodwin distribution-demand cycle appears to be 
persistent, but the level of the labor share at its focus fell after 1980. 
As we have seen, household and foreign net borrowing flows were 
strongly trended until 2007-09. 
The only stable ratio on the real side appears to be between GDP 
and “primary wealth,” or the value of the capital stock plus government 
debt. Since around 1950 this ratio has been close to one-quarter. 
Because government debt is a fraction of the value of capital, this 
observation means that the U.S. capital/output ratio fluctuates around 
a level of four, consistent with the range of variation in capacity utili- 
zation shown in Figure 2.
On the financial side, the structure of the economy has changed 
dramatically ― especially after 1980. The changes are clear in Figure 
10 which shows ratios of financial positions to primary wealth for house- 
holds, the rest of the world, the financial sector, and non-financial 
business.
The most striking change is the growth of total assets and liabilities 
of the financial sector from around 40% of primary wealth in 1980 to 
over 100% in the late 2000s. Much of the shift can be explained by 
the expansion of mutual and retirement funds. But it also reflected the 
explosion of securitization. There was a major reallocation of sources of 
the non-financial sector’s debt from the balance sheets of banks (e.g., 
mortgages, credit cards, etc.) to securities markets (e.g., corporate bonds, 
commercial paper, and asset-backed securities). The banks’ share fell 
from over 45% to 30% and the securities markets’ participation rose 
correspondingly.
The asset and liability positions of the rest of the world rose by 
around 20% of total wealth. More importantly, the share in wealth of 
the sector’s own net worth rose by more than five percentage points, 
building up with the string of current account deficits that began after 
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FIGURE 10
FINANCIAL POSITIONS OF HOUSEHOLDS, REST OF THE WORLD, FINANCIAL 
SECTOR, AND NON-FINANCIAL BUSINESS RELATIVE TO TOTAL WEALTH
1980.
The share of net worth of households fluctuated parallel to the value 
of their financial assets. The value of tangible assets rose in line with 
price of residential capital and as already illustrated in Figure 8 debt 
rose a bit faster. The non-financial business borrowing binge during 
the 1990s shown in Figure 3 (the dot.com episode) was reflected in a 
rising share of debt before 2000.
These financial movements provide another angle to view the economy 
after 1980. Divergent trends emerged, with contradictions that became 
apparent during 2007-09. How they will shift in the 20-teens remains 
to be seen.
VI. International Complications
The U.S. position in the global economy has shifted markedly over 
the decades. Emerging from the war it was clearly the international 
hegemon ( in a favorite label from Charlie Kindleberger), but its potency 
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TABLE 1
SCHEMATIC BALANCE OF PAYMENTS FLOWS AROUND 1950
deteriorated steadily over time. Following a schematic proposed by 
Minsky, Table 1 illustrates world payments flows in the early post-war 
period (late 1940s and early 1950s). 
At that time, developing countries had no significant debt after a 
period of high export prices for raw materials; debt-service obligations 
among the rich countries were ill-defined. As a consequence interna- 
tional payments of interest and dividends were minimal. The U.S. had 
a strong trade surplus so its overall current account (＋A) was positive. 
On capital account there were large flows from the U.S. to the rest of 
the world of long-term investment (－B) and transfers (－C) supporting 
post-war reconstruction. 
These flows exceeded the current account surplus and had to be offset 
by movements of short-term capital toward the U.S. and/or changes in 
reserves. On the U.S. side the capital inflow took the form of increasing 
foreign deposits in money center banks and sales of Treasury bonds 
abroad. These dollar “exports” added liquidity and propelled credit ex- 
pansion by banking systems in the rest of the world. Meanwhile the 
trade surplus propped up profits and employment in the U.S.
The structure of international payments outlined in Table 1 was the 
foundation for historically rapid and stable output growth worldwide 
during the Golden Age in the 1950s and 1960s. Perhaps unsurprisingly 
the long bonanza carried the seeds of its own destruction in the form 
of dynamics of stocks and flows over time (a point neglected by Keynes 
but emphasized by Minsky and Godley).
The problem was that the long-term capital movements from the 
U.S. exceeded its short-term capital inflows. The resulting increase in 
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net foreign assets meant that interest and dividend income rose from 
“zero” in Table 1. With both major components of the current account 
positive, on capital account there would have to be ever rising U.S. 
foreign investment and transfers, or reduced short-term inflows.
The response of the U.S. was to “go negative” on its trade and service 
account, absorbing rising net exports from the rest of the world. 
Recognizing that the international payments system lacks degrees of 
freedom, Robert Triffin invented a dilemma to describe the situation. A 
trade and services deficit was required of the U.S. to permit short-term 
capital inflows to generate liquidity for the rest of the world. The other 
horn was that the U.S. presumably could not sustain the deficit 
indefinitely (another stock-flow argument). Dollar devaluation might 
ultimately be needed to reduce the U.S. current account deficit. 
Triffin’s proposed remedy was to create an international reserve 
currency to take the burden off the U.S. The institutional response that 
actually occurred was to give the IMF power to issue special drawing 
rights (SDR) to serve as an international reserve asset. SDRs in practice 
never got anywhere. There was no felt need because beginning with 
Eurodollars and expanding exponentially thereafter the world financial 
system could produce international liquidity without limit. In any case 
the overall U.S. current account turned negative in the early 1980s.
For the period after 1980 it is possible to insert numbers into the 
format of Table 1. Table 2 takes up the story for selected years through 
2006, presenting payments flows as shares of world GDP. Several 
points stand out.
By 1980, U.S. interest and dividend income from abroad had risen 
to 0.25% of world GDP. The overall current account was still positive 
but small (0.09%) and short-term capital movements were negligible. 
Already in 1983, the configuration of flows had begun to shift markedly. 
The current account became visibly negative (-0.22%). With continuing 
net foreign investment and transfers (mostly the latter in 1983) short- 
term capital movements toward the U.S. reappeared at 0.34%. But now 
the U.S. was issuing short-term liabilities to finance foreign investment 
and transfers plus a current account deficit, not investment and trans- 
fers minus a current surplus as during the Golden Age. Its hegemonic 
role was beginning to erode. 
The situation deteriorated further after 1983. As a share of world 
GDP, dividend and interest income declined and the trade and services 
account steadily worsened. Long-term investment and transfers continued 
to be negative items but their importance diminished in comparison to 
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Sources: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics; IMF Global Economic Outlook 
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TABLE 2
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS FLOWS ― SELECTED YEARS 1980-2006
(PERCENTAGE SHARES OF WORLD GDP)
(Unite: %)
the trade deficit. By the mid-2000s short-term capital inflows were 1.6% 
of world GDP ― a macroeconomically important movement of funds.
The U.S. deficit on trade and services of course had to be met by 
surpluses in the rest of the world. China (following Japan) became a 
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key player, with its surplus rising from 0.02% in 1983 to 0.43% in 
2006, with the growth concentrated in the 2000s. It also received large 
inflows of net foreign investment and transfers, although the magnitude 
was smaller than the current account surplus. The balancing item in 
Chinese accounts took the form of large increases in international 
reserves.
The reserve growth can be interpreted as being defensive in part, to 
build up a hedge against a replay of the Asian crises of the late 1990s. 
But it was also the counterpart of the consumption-led U.S. trade 
deficit, which had to be financed by rising capital inflows which to a 
large extent took the form of acquisition of U.S. Treasury and govern- 
ment-sponsored agency (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) bonds by the 
Chinese and other foreign central banks.
As shown in Figure 3 the U.S. payments situation began to change 
with the onset of crisis ― there was at least a modest reduction in net 
lending from the rest of the world. Whether the economy can switch 
back toward external current balance or even a surplus is an open 
question. 
VII. Deciphering the Past
One way to summarize the discussion so far is to list the forces that 
led into the 2007-09 crisis.
A. Factors Contributing to the Crisis
1) There was a major shift in the political economic environment. 
The liberal rebound gathered strength beginning in the 1960s and tri- 
umphed in the USA with the election of Ronald Reagan. The practical 
effects of (neo)liberalism included dismantling financial regulation, suc- 
cessful attacks on labor’s bargaining power, and an ideological shift in 
support of God and capitalism. It remains to be seen if this wave will 
recede.
2) The American business cycle continued, with changes over time in 
the real interest rate, the labor share and profit rate, and household 
net borrowing helping to drive fluctuations in output. But all four 
variables began to trend after 1980, weakening their cyclical role but 
generating effects that spilled over into asset prices and the balance of 
payments.  
3) The ratio of household net borrowing to GDP increased by around 
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10 percentage points between the early 1980s and the mid-2000s. The 
household debt to income ratio roughly doubled over the same period. 
As just noted, these trends were superimposed on a sharp decrease of 
the wage share of GDP and an increase in the rate of profit. Inequality 
in the size distribution of income increased markedly.
4) The real S & P 500 index of equity prices grew more than five-fold 
between the early 1980s and late 1990s. Thereafter it fell and rose, but 
did not attain its previous peak.
5) Much of the higher borrowing was collateralized by rising prices of 
equity and (especially) housing. Real housing prices also roughly doubled 
over 25 years. The ratios of household debt and expenditure to net 
worth respectively were stable and fell until the late 1990s when both 
shot up as the dot.com and housing crashes cut into net worth. The 
obvious interpretation is that households with incomes below the top 
percentiles of the size distribution took advantage of the opportunity 
that capital gains on equity and housing provided to run up debt to 
maintain their living standards in the face of stagnating or falling real 
incomes.
6) As a share of GDP, foreign net borrowing decreased (or net lending 
to the U.S. increased) by around seven percentage points, roughly 
“twinned” to rising household net borrowing. By the mid-2000s the U.S. 
deficit for foreign trade and services was around 1.5% of world GDP, 
offset by short-term capital inflows of roughly the same magnitude. 
Meanwhile, China’s current account surplus grew to around 0.45% of 
world GDP. One might argue on somewhat functionalist lines that the 
U.S. deficit was driven by a strong exchange rate, which in turn both 
allowed cheap imports to help offset overall stagnation of real wages 
and attracted capital inflows.
7) Real interest rates fell steadily from high single digit levels to near 
zero between the early 1980s and mid-2000s. Standard arguments 
suggest that falling rates probably stimulated the booms in equity and 
housing prices.
8) The ratios of assets and liabilities of the financial sector to total 
wealth rose from around 0.4 to 1.15 between 1980 and 2005. This in- 
crease in financial depth was accompanied by a steady relaxation of 
regulatory controls over finance imposed during the New Deal. In most 
instances, regulation was eased in response to innovations in the 
market. The possibilities they created to make paper profits generated 
political pressure on regulators to relax existing controls. A “light touch” 
regulatory regime was put into place, on the assumption that firms 
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would effectively police themselves to avoid financial breakdowns.
9) Beyond the changes in ideology mentioned above, the intellectual 
rationale for much of the shift in regulation came from the abolition of 
Keynesian concepts in macroeconomic theory and finance theory’s or- 
ogeny beginning in the 1950s. Wall Street applauded both develop- 
ments, because they veiled extreme speculation with intellectual re- 
spectability. 
B. Weighing the Contributions
All nine factors acted together to cause the crisis. Nevertheless, there 
may be room to ponder the relative significance of each. Factors 7 
through 9 would probably have supported a financial mania, followed 
by panic and crash, regardless of what happened on the real side of 
the economy. After the long ascent of equity prices mentioned in point 
4 the system was ripe for a shake-out, while deregulation set the stage 
for a major crisis. The key question is how it was transmitted to the 
real side.
The shift in household behavior noted in points 3 and 5 provided 
the crucial link. Households were pushed in the direction of running 
up debt to maintain living standards in the face of their deteriorating 
earned income position (point 2). The booms in asset prices provided 
collateral to enable them to borrow domestically. With the U.S. eco- 
nomy as a whole becoming a positive net borrower, it needed short- 
term capital inflows. The rest of the world was willing to provide the 
finance, with China and the oil exporters providing the counterpart 
imports into the U.S.
In global macroeconomic terms all these economic factors acted 
together, as of course they had to. The shift in political economy (factor 
1) made the whole process possible. That environment will have to 
change if a relapse into economic crisis is to be avoided. In fall 2009, 
irrational enthusiasms supported by extremely cheap money were re- 
emerging in the financial sector ― not a good omen.
VIII. Pondering the Future
Donald Rumsfeld is probably not a close student of Keynes. But he 
does know how military planners think, no doubt including the early 
19
th century Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz who wrote about the 
“fog of war.” Maynard himself would probably have approved of 
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Rumsfeld’s 2002 observation (with its own version of fundamental 
uncertainty) that “There are known knowns. These are things we know 
that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are 
things that we now know we don’t know. But there are also unknown 
unknowns. These are things we do not know we don’t know.” 
Rumsfeld’s formulation was on target for the future of U.S. and global 
macroeconomics. Even more than usual, it undoubtedly holds unknowns 
that we cannot possibly know.
In considering the prospects, it makes sense to begin by thinking 
about known knowns. Among them are the facts that U.S. net bor- 
rowing flows must sum to zero, and that there are very few degrees of 
freedom in an aggregated global macro model comprising the USA, 
“China” broadly construed to include countries with structural trade 
surpluses, Euroland, oil exporters, and the rest.
A. Net Borrowing  
It is not hard to put together unpleasant scenarios. A more interesting 
question is what a favorable one might look like. One component could 
be a return of household net borrowing to its circa 1980 levels in the 
range of -7% of GDP at the trough of a recession (that is, households 
would be lending ＋7% of GDP to the rest of the system). Net borrowing 
was heading in that direction in late 2009. Where it will bottom out 
depends on how strongly fear of the future will drive households toward 
more saving. The relevant historical parallel is the Great Depression. 
U.S. consumers practiced conservative finance for more than a genera- 
tion thereafter.
If residential investment recovers on the upswing, a return to the 
range of net borrowing prior to and immediately after 1980 in Figure 
5.8 is a possibility. Say that households borrow -3% of GDP (or lend 
＋3%) near the top of the cycle.
There will have to be fiscal contraction in the wake of the Obama 
stimulus package. If government net borrowing drops to the ＋3% 
range, then government and household borrowing flows would be 
offsetting, with foreign and business net borrowing becoming “twins.” 
B. International Implications
If these changes play out, the peak U.S. current account deficit 
could fall to the range of 0.5% of world GDP, or roughly 2% of local 
output. How would the global economy adjust? On capital account, it 
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probably would have no problem in providing short-term capital flows 
to “finance” a U.S. deficit of that magnitude. On trade account, the 
non-oil economies with structural export surpluses such as Germany 
and China would have to go through a large readjustment; to a lesser 
extent oil exporters would be in trouble as well. 
One relevant question is whether the U.S. retains enough hegemonic 
power to force such an adjustment. Contemporary theories discussed 
in Chapter 8 such the global savings glut or Bretton Woods II assign a 
passive role to the U.S. In an update of the Triffin dilemma it reacts to 
whatever the rest of the world chooses to do. Controlling national net 
borrowing is not easy but there are highly imperfect policies discussed 
below that might allow it to be done. A related question is whether the 
U.S. still has the industrial capacity to increase exports and/or sub- 
stitute imports to the tune of 1% of world GDP or 4% of local GDP at 
the top of the cycle.
C. Income Distribution
Another known unknown involves future shifts in the income distri- 
bution, with the labor share and the interest rate as the key variables. 
Exiting from the stimulus will require interest rate increases which 
would dampen asset price excursions and presumably discourage house- 
hold borrowing. Whether there will be a recovery in households’ earnings 
big enough to let them pay for desired consumption without running 
up new liabilities is a key known unknown. 
The standard explanation of income inequalities from the economic 
mainstream is that they are inevitable. The economy is operating per- 
fectly efficiently so that there is no slack that could be utilized for 
income redistribution. The simple truth is that factors such as globali- 
zation and financial innovation have shifted incomes in favor of affluent 
agents. A more fundamental cause was systematic repression of labor’s 
bargaining power beginning with the Reagan administration.
From a broader perspective, the sociopolitical question is why such 
income concentration has been permitted to occur ― surely changes in 
the nature of the social contract must be involved. Consider the head 
of the Norway’s Norsk Hydro. A few years ago he was getting around 
$1 million per year in salary plus rather less in realized stock options, 
levels that his board’s compensation committee allowed him. He re- 
ceived less than 10% of what CEOs at smaller American competitors 
were paid. His relative penury was in part a consequence of the Nordic 
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socioeconomic model which has rested for decades on income equali- 
zation. The United States was never anywhere near as egalitarian as 
Norway, but it is striking how its societal tolerance for enormous 
payments to people at the top has grown over the past two or three 
decades.
D. Finance
The main question is not about formulating policies to help the 
financial sector restrain its own excesses, although that would certainly 
be desirable. On that front the prospects are not promising. After all, 
over a period of 20 years the sector staged the 1987 stock market 
crash, the Mexican crisis, the Asian crisis, Enron, the LTCM collapse, 
the end of the internet bubble, and 2007-09. An almost known known 
is that finance has some new catastrophe hiding up its sleeve.
IX. Policy Options
The real policy challenge in this area is to build a firewall between 
finance and the real economy, to shield the rest of us from the bankers’ 
excesses. A revived version of Glass-Steagall on the financial side would 
be helpful, along with restrictions on households such as ceilings on 
loan-to-value ratios for residential mortgages. Long before James Tobin, 
in the General Theory Keynes recommended a transfer tax on financial 
transactions. Restrictions or taxes on short-term borrowing by financial 
firms could help avoid maturity mismatches between assets and liabili- 
ties. Such policies might prove politically feasible if Congressional 
hearings into finance that got underway in early 2010 follow the path 
blazed by the Pecora Hearings after the Great Crash.  
The state can be all thumbs when it attempts intervention to reduce 
income inequality. Nevertheless tools do exist ― progressive taxes on 
income and capital gains which could be used to hold back growth of 
high incomes, steps to strengthen union recruiting and bargaining 
power, aggressive Congressional or judicial investigations of Wall Street, 
salutary jail sentences for financial insiders besides Bernie Madoff, an 
excess profits tax or capital levy on finance to recoup part of the cost 
of the bailout ― all spring to mind. One reason why the Norsk Hydro 
chief mentioned above was so poor is that the government as part- 
owner of the company intervened to hold his remuneration down.
The trade balance does respond to the exchange rate in the U.S., 
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meaning that there is room for intervention by the Fed to devalue the 
dollar. Selective capital controls might ease the task (Wall Street would 
resist furiously but would not necessarily be 100% successful). Export 
subsidies and import restrictions, disguised or not, might also have a 
role to play. So would conscious industrial policy, expanding on the 
ones included in the Obama stimulus package. The point is not so 
much begger-my-neighbor but rather rebalancing the external position 
of the U.S. economy so that it does not have to operate in self- 
destructive fashion.
All these and similar policies will not be applied unless the world 
and national economies do go through a double movement, toward a 
more egalitarian and anti-liberal sociopolitical regime. That happened 
late in the 19
th century and in the wake of the Great Depression. This 
possibility is the most important known unknown. It is not obvious 
that it will come to pass ― the unknown unknowns will seal its fate. 
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